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HOMESTEAD LAW IN WISCONSIN
The first constitution which was presented to the people of
this stafe, then a territory, contained a provision securing to the
debtor, from forced sale, a homestead. This provision was most
thoroughly discussed before the people and although that pro-
vision in the form it was proposed fell with the rejected constitu-
tion, yet the next constitutional convention called immediately
thereafter, not only recognized the principle of exemption but
made it mandatory upon the legislature to provide "wholesome
laws exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or
sale for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter con-
tracted".' No former contracts were to be interfered with; but
after the passage of such laws, all contracts would be made in
view of the exemption allowed, and without any hope or expecta-
tion of making the property thus exempted a resource out of
which fulfillinent of the contract could be enforced; and no re-
straint could be placed upon any interference with the personal
liberty of the debtor; for imprisonment for debt was prohibited
by the constitution.2 . The principle of exemption was therefore
made a fundamental article and recognized as among the primary
rights of the citizen to be protected and secured.
The constitutional provision made it mandatory upon the
legislature to pass a homestead exemption law. There was, how-
ever, no power to compel the legislature to pass such law. The
courts possessed no power to compel the legislature to enact the
laws required by that section; nor could the courts in the absence
of any statutes upon the subject by judicial decision supply the
deficiency; but the omission would nevertheless be a clear viola-
tion of the plainly expressed will of the people. However, hav-
ing once passed such law, the legislature thereafter was power-
less to wholly repeal such law without the contemporaneous
passage of a substitute.3
In pursuance of this constitutional mandate the first session
of the legislature enacted in July, i848, a homestead exemption
law,4 . then recognizing the privilege of the debtor to enjoy the
i. Section 17, Article i, Wisconsin Constitution.
2. Section 16, Article i, Wisconsin Constitution.
3. Bull vs. Conroe, 13 Wisconsin 233, 237.
4. Page 40, Laws of 1848, Wisconsin. Law as then passed is found un-
changed in the Revised Statutes of 1849 as Sections 51 and 52, Chapter
io2. These sections are found unchanged in the Revised Statutes of i858,
Sections 23 and 24, Chapter 134 R. S. 1858. These sections somewhat
modified are now found as Sections 2983 of the Statutes.
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necessary comforts of life by a wholesome law, exempting a rea-
sonable amount of property from seizure or sale for the pay-
ment of any debt or liability, considering that the requisite to the
comfort and happiness of the debtor and his family nd to the
good order and welfare of society was a home -a suitable place
of residence with appurtenances in which he and they might re-
main unmolested by the importunate and pinching demands of
his creditors.
The legislature did not intend to relieve debtors from the
discharge of the duty to pay their debts or to interfere with the
general power to compel its performance. But while a rigid and
exact compliance with contracts and obligations was esteemed a
matter of general public good, to enforce which it behooved the
state to furnish its citizens with adequate means and facilities,
still in view of the unfortunate condition of many debtors and
the social and political aids which it engendered, it was considered
better for society at large to withdraw from creditors so much
of that coercive power which had theretofore remained in their
hands, as was requisite to enable debtors, if they -choose, by re-
taining these necessary comforts, to ameliorate their condition
and relieve the public of an unwelcome burden. Individual hap-
piness and public welfare demanded that forty acres in the coun-
try and one-fourth of an acre in the city be exempt from execu-
tion when used as a homestead.
HOMESTEAD RIGHT NOT A VESTED RIGHT.
The homestead rights thus granted to a debtor are not as
to the particular property which comes within the protection of
existing laws, vested rights or as partaking so much of the char-
acter of such rights that the legislature cannot by future enact-
ments change or modify the laws so as to deprive debtors of a
portion of the property which they hold exempt under existing
laws. The immunities and benefits which debtors are to derive
from the operation of such laws are spoken of in the constitu-
tion as privileges, not absolute right. They effect the remedies
of the creditor rather than the strict legal rights of the debtor.
They are more in the nature of gratuities, commanded by the con-
stitution and enforced by the legislature. 5 However, the legisla-
ture having once passed an exemption law must leave the debtors
in the enjoyment of enough of the comforts of life, so that it can-
5. Bull vs. Couroe, 13 Wis. 233, 239.
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not fairly and reasonably be said that the requirements of the
constitution remain in whole, or in any material part unsatisfied.6
MEANING OF TERM HOMESTEAD.
The word "Homestead" signifies the prescribed quantity of
land or lands, on which is situated the dwelling house used as a
home. The chief characteristic and attribute of the homestead,
therefore, as the word itself implies, is the land where is situated
the dwelling and family of the owner.7 The law contemplates
that the homestead should form one body; it cannot be made up
of disconnected tracts. It may be divided into separate lots by
streams of water, highways, railways, etc., but must form one
body as compact as possible subject to such easement.8
The question whether a building is a homestead does not de-
pend upon its situation, external appearance or internal arrange-
ment, but upon the fact that it is really and truly occupied as a
dwelling house by the owner and his family; and the owner does
not forfeit the right of devoting a portion of the building to an-
other use than the residence of the family. Prior to the amend-
ment the homestead provided by the statute was restricted only
by the amount of land mentioned therein and not by the value
thereof.9 This has been changed so as to limit value to $5,000.10
Within this principle a building occupied as a homestead and used
by the owner as a hotel was exempt." If there are situated upon
the exempted lot various buildings beside the dwelling house
which are rented for stores, offices, etc., and occupied as such,
these other buildings are not included in the homestead exemp-
tions.12
If the premises are unoccupied as a homestead at the time
the judgment is docketed the debtor cannot defeat or prevent its
enforcement by afterwards moving in and occupying them as a
homestead, so that if a judgment debtor, owning two lots of
land, one of which is his homestead, sells his homestead and
6. See dissenting opinion Dixon, C. J.; Phelps vs. Rooney, 9 Wis. 78.
7. Bunker vs. Locke, 15 Wis. 635, 636; Phelps vs. Rooney, 9 Wis. 83.
See also Prin vs. Stone, 7o Am. Dec. 348 note.
8. Bunker vs. Locke, supra; Binzel vs. Grogan, 67 Wis. 149; Hornby
vs. Sikes, 56 Wis. 383.
9. Phelps vs. Rooney,'9 Wis. 7o.
IO. Section 2983.
ii. Harriman vs. Queen Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 72.
12. Casselian vs. Packard, 16 Wis. Iiry.
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thereafter occupies the other lot as such, the lien of the judgment
on such other lots is thereby not removed.' 3
Where the owner of a homestead abandons it, as such, still
retaining the legal title, judgments docketed against him become
liens upon the land at once without any proceedings in equity to
enforce them.' 4 The law of 1858 provided that the owner of a
homestead "may remove therefrom" and "that such removal"
shall not render such homestead subject or liable to forced sale
on execution. This provision was construed by the court to mean
temporary removal with animo revertendi and not a permanent
removal with aninto manendi.1 5 Prior to the passage of this
amendment the court held that the exemption of the debtor's
homestead continued only so long as he owned and occupied it as
a homestead.1 6
PROCEEDS DERIVED FROM SALE OF
HOMESTEAD.
Moneys due to the grantor of the homestead as a part of the
purchase price were held not liable to garnishment when debtor
intended in good faith to use the money to purchase another
homestead.17 The rule of this decision was incorporated into
Section 2983 which provides "the homestead exemption shall ex-
tend to the proceeds derived from such sale when held with the
intention to procure another homestead therewith for a period
not exceeding two years". This right to the exemption of the
proceeds is not waived by debtor using part of the proceeds to
pay debts and support family,' 8 nor does the statute require as a
condition of such exemption that the debtor shall continue to re-
side in this state during the two years nor that he shall intend to
procure another homestead in this state.19 Moneys arising from
the insurance of the homestead property are exempt also.2 0
13. Bridge vs. Ward, 35 Wis. 687.
14. Moore vs. Sntead, 89 Wis. 558.
15. Jarvais vs. Moe, 38 Wis. 440; Zinznier vs. Pauley, 5i Wis. 282;
Moore vs. Sinead, 89 Wis. 558, 568; Blackburn vs. Lake Shore Traffic Co.,
go Wis. 362.
i6. Hoyt vs. Howe, 3 Wis. 752 (Pinney).
17. Watkins vs. Blatschinski, 40 Wis. 347.
j8. Binzel vs. Grogan, 67 Wis. 147.
ig. Hewitt vs. Allen, 54 Wis. 583, Cassody, J., dissenting.
2o. Section 2982.
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AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES.
The phrase "used for agricultural purposes" as applied to
lands outside of villages and cities has been in the homestead law
of Wisconsin ever since it was enacted in July, 1848. Our court
has held that by Section :2983 the legislature intended fully to ex-
ecute the mandate of Section 17, Article I of the constitution;
and under that statute the homestead of a debtor which he owns
and occupies together with the specified quantity of land appur-
tenant thereto is exempt from seizure or sale without regard to
the use which he put such land or the business he pursues
thereon. 21 The fisherman may build his home upon the barren
beach, using his land for the spreading of his nets and the moving
of his vessels; or the hunter may build his home in the forest and
make no use of his land appurtenant to his dwellings except to
pass over it yet he would be entitled to the exemption and would
not be required to raise a bushel of beans or other produce an-
nually upon his land, or pasture a cow upon it to come within the
phrase "used for agricultural purposes".
TRANSFER AND INCUMBRANCE.
The act provides "no mortgage or alienation of a homestead
by a married man shall be valid without the signature of the
wife". It was early held22 by our court that the assignment by
a married man, without his wife, of a lease of a lot, and his sale
of the dwelling house on the lot occupied by him as a home-
stead was not against the prohibition of this act, thus holding that
the law as it then stood only prohibited the owner of land con-
stituting a homestead from alienating the same without signature
of wife. After this decision the legislature amended the law so
that now any mortgage or other alienation by a married man of
that which the law2 3 exempts as his homestead without the signa-
ture of his wife is absolutely void. If, however, he is in pos-
session under a lease which provides that the property shall be
used exclusively as a hotel, the fact that he lives in the house will
not make it a homestead and the husband may assign such lease
without the signature of the wife.2 4 The exemption extends to
and protects the homestead, though it be held only under an equi-
table title, such as a land contract, and the owner, if a married
21. Binzel vs. Grogan, 67 Wis. 147.
22. Platto vs. Cady, 12 Wis. 461; 13 Wis. 480; 46 Wis. 682.
23. Chapter 172, Laws of 1867.
24. Green vs. Pierce, 6o Wis. 375.
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man, cannot make an alienation of such homestead without the
signature of his wife.2 5 The husband may change his home-
stead or place of residence against the wish or consent of the
wife, and thereby is enabled to make legal transfer of the same,
without the signature of his wife-subject of course to her in-
choate dower right.26
WHO MAY CLAIM HOMESTEAD RIGHTS.
The benefits of the homestead exemption law are, however,
not restricted to married men ;27 but a single man who owns real
estate and resides upon it, or who rents the premises and boards
and lodges with his tenants is entitled to homestead rights. The
homestead of the husband is in contemplation of law, the home-
stead of the wife and its character is not changed by the fact that
she with or without reason chooses to live separate from the hus-
band 28 but during the husband's life he is the absolute owner and
possessor of the homestead and the statute does not have the
effect to create a concurrent estate or possession in the wife.2 9
Our court early decided 30 that to constitute a homestead the land
must be owned in severalty, so that it could be set out by metes
and bounds from that which was not exempt. In other words,
an undivided interest in land cannot constitute a homestead.
This defect was remedied and the statute now provides :31
"such exemption shall extend to land not exceeding, altogether
the amount aforesaid owned by husband and wife, jointly, or in
common, and to the interest therein of a tenant in common having
a homestead thereon, with the consent express or implied of the
co-tenants."
DESCENT OF HOMESTEAD.
By Section 2, Chapter 137, Laws of 1858, it provided that
upon the death of the owner of a homestead, the same should
descend to his widow, to be held by her during widowhood free
from the encumbrances of all judgments and claims against de-
ceased except mortgages lawfully executed thereon. This law
25. McCabe vs. Mazzuchelli, 13 Wis. 478.
26. Godfrey vs. Thornton, 46 Wis. 677.
27. Myers vs. Ford, 22 Wis. 139.
28. Herron vs. Knapp Co., 72 Wis. 553.
29. Mash vs. Bloom, 126 Wis. 385.
30. West vs. Ward, 26 Wis. 579.
3r. Section 2983 R. S., Chapter 269, Laws of IgoI. Bartle vs. Bartle,
132 Wis. 392.
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was amended by Chapter 270 Laws of 1864, Chapter 3oI Laws
of 1883, and can be readily found by referring to Section 2271
of the Statutes.
OTHER QUESTIONS THAT HAVE ARISEN
UNDER THE STATUTE.
The homestead law is a beneficient one and it is the duty of
the court to construe it liberally. 32 The law exempts a home-
stead from a judgment rendered in an action of tort as well as a
judgment in any civil action.3 3 It is now the law of this state
that where a debtor fails to select at the time of execution sale,
his homestead, he is confined thereafter to the legal subdivision
on which the dwelling house stands.3 4
Lumber and other building material purchased by a debtor
for the purpose of repairs of the dwelling house and paid for by
him and deposited upon the premises with intention to use the
same in repairing the building are exempt. 35
The statute extends its protection to one who buys land with
the intention of building on it, and to the lumber and material
actually on the ground designed for use in the construction of the
house. Such land is "owned and occupied" within the meaning
of the statutes.3 6
Where a mortgage covers the homestead and other property
if the homestead can be sold separately without injury to the
owner, in that case the homestead shall not be offered for sale,
until all other lands conveyed by the mortgage shall have been
offered and sold.3 7
A remainderman living with the tenant for life cannot by
virtue of such possession claim the right of homestead. 38 The
homestead right of a widow is not subject to partition, and the
32. Binzel vs. Grogan, 67 Wis. 47; Scofield vs. Hopkins, 61 Wis. 373,
374; Watkins vs. Blatschinski, 40 Wis. 352; Jarvais vs. Moe, 38 Wis. 446.
33- Smith vs. Omans, 17 Wis. 395.
34. Martin vs. Aultnan Co., 8o Wis. 15o; see Kent vs. Lasley, 48 Wis.
257; Kent vs. Agard, 22 Wis. 150.
35. Krueger vs. Pierce, 37 Wis. 269, 271.
36. Scofield vs. Hopkins, 61 Wis. 370; Shaw vs. Kirby, 93 Wis. 379.
See also Zimmers vs. Pauley, 51 Wis. 282; Hoppe vs. Goldberg, 82 Wis.
66o.
37. Chapter 133, Laws of 187o. Hansen vs. Edgar, 34 Wis. 653; Smith
vs. Wait, 39 Wis. 512; Rozek vs. Redzinski, 87 Wis. 525, 530.
38. Cornish vs. Frees, 74 Wis. 490, 496. See also Reeves & Co. vs.
Saxton, 145 Wis. IO.
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circuit court has no jurisdiction in partition proceedings to order
a sale so as to divest her of such right.3 9 The use of a home-
stead for an unlawful purpose, such as keeping a bawdy-house
and selling liquor without license does not render it subject to
seizure or sale or execution.4 0
The owner of a lot adjoining a street owns to the center of
the street, subject to the public easements. Our court has held,
however, that land included in a public street or alley is not to be
reckoned in the-measurement for the homestead exemption. The
homestead, statute exempts land "owned" and "occupied"; while
the owner of land owns to the center of the street, he has no
right to "occupy the street." 41
If agricultural land occupied as a homestead is by the act of
the legislature annexed to or included within the limits of a city
or incorporated village, even against the wishes of the owner who
still continues to use it for agricultural purposes only, the law
exempts such lands used for agricultural purposes no longer. The
exemption is abridged so as to include one quarter of an acre
with the dwelling house thereon and its appurtenances. 4 2
The conveyance of the homestead of an insolvent debtor is
not fraudulent as to creditors. 43
MAX SCOOwTz, JR.,
Dean Marquette University Law School.
39. Voelz vs. Voelz, 88 Wis. 461.
40. Prince vs. Hake, 75 Wis. 638.
41. Weisbrod vs. Daenicke, 36 Wis. 73.
42. Bull vs. Conroe, 13 Wis. 233.
43. Shawano County Bank vs. Koeppen, 78 Wis. 533; Bank of Col-
merce vs. Fowler, 93 Wis. 241.
